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I. QUOTATIONS OF INTEREST
"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor."'
2
"Thou shalt neither side with the mighty to do wrong."

If he is a professional and not merely a hired, albeit skilled hand, the
lawyer is not free to do anything his client might do in the same
circumstances. The corollary of that proposition does set a minimum
standard: the lawyer must be at least as candid and honest as his client
would be required to be. The agent of the client, that is, his attorney-atlaw, must not perpetrate the kind of fraud or deception that would
vitiate a bargain if practiced by his principal. Beyond that, the
profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard for attorneys'
professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the public: The
lawyer must act honestly and in good faith. Another lawyer, or a
layman, who deals with a lawyer should not need to exercise the same
degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly antique copper
jugs in an oriental bazaar. It is inherent in the concept of an ethic, as
a principle of good conduct, that it is morally binding on the conscience
of the professional, and not merely a rule of the game adopted because
other players observe (or fail to adopt) the same rule. Good conduct
exacts more than mere convenience. It is not sufficient to call on
personal self-interest; this is the standard created by the thesis that the
same adversary met today may be faced again tomorrow, and one had
best not prejudice that future engagement.

While it might strain present concepts of the role of the lawyer in an
adversary system, surely the professional standards must ultimately
impose upon him a duty not to accept an unconscionable deal. While
some difficulty in line-drawing is inevitable when such a distinction is
sought to be made, there must be a point at which the lawyer cannot
ethically accept an arrangement that is completely unfair to the other
side, be that opponent a patsy or a tax collector. So I posit a second
precept: The lawyer may not accept a result that is unconscionably
unfairto the otherparty.3

1.
2.
3.
589, 591

Exodus 30:13.
Exodus 33:2.
Judge Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La. L. Rev. 577,
(1975).
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"[T]o mislead an opponent about one's true settling point is the essence of
negotiation."'
II. INTRODUCTION

Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") is designed to avoid the courtroom
and litigation. It is designed to operate outside of the court and only to be
enforceable, if at all, by a court's confirmatory decree. Participants in creating
ADR structures should consider what ethical rules, if any, apply in ADR absent
litigation or express agreement of the parties.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules distinguish between non-litigation
behavior and behavior that takes place after a suit is filed. This paper argues for a
single ethical standard for non-litigation and litigation lawyer conduct.
III. THE PROBLEM UNDER THE MODEL CODE

Although lawyers hold themselves out as part ofa profession, bar-promulgated rules relating to the ethics of negotiation are, at best, sparse and perfunctory.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) has been
criticized for putting the adversary process above the search for ultimate justice.
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, zealous advocacy of a
client "within the bounds of the law" is the touchtone concept. Canon 7 of the
Model Code requires that all doubts be resolved in favor of the client. Pertinent
portions of Model Canon 7 provide:
A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously within the Bounds of
the Law
Ethical Considerations
EC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system,
is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which
includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations.'
EC 7-3 Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer
may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser. A lawyer
may serve simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but the two
roles are essentially different .... While serving as advocate, a lawyer
should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the
law.6

4.

James J.White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiations,

1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926, 928 (1980).
5. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
6. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-3 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
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Canon 7, in its Ethical Considerations, distinguishes between the responsibility of a lawyer as advocate in a "tribunal" and the responsibility of a lawyer
outside the "tribunal." While courts are clearly "tribunals," the exact scope of
the term "tribunal" is not clear. Is a voluntary mediation a "tribunal"? Does it
matter if the mediation is commanded through a court-ordered ADR rule? The
Model Code provides no answers.
Model EC 7-5 allows a lawyer to continue to represent a client who engages
in questionable conduct as long as the conduct is not "illegal;" Model EC 7-4
allows the lawyer to defend the client's actions with "any permissible construction of the law," as long as a position taken in litigation is not "frivolous." The
Ethical Considerations further distinguish between criminal acts and other acts.
Under the Ethical Considerations, it apparently is acceptable for an attorney to
take or imply positions that an attorney would consider of little merit. Likewise,
an attorney apparently may allow the client to voice such positions. The only
prohibition is against criminal acts or "frivolous" legal positions. The prohibition
against asserting "frivolous" legal positions appears weak given the fact that the
Model Code requires that all doubts be resolved in favor of the client:
EC 7-4 The advocate may urge any permissible construction ofthe law

favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to
the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail.8
EC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving
his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the
ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing
his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in
the representation of his client even though his client has elected to
pursue a course ofconduct contrary to the advice ofthe lawyer so long
as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal
conduct or to take afrivolous legal position. A lawyer should never
encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client
on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor.9
While a lawyer should "treat with consideration all persons involved in the
legal process'" (e.g., smile while you are taking advantage of the other
person), the lawyer must always act in the best interest of the client. The lawyer
may request that the client give permission for the attorney not to act in a
manner that seems unjust, but if the client refuses permission, the Model Code

7.

Compare the detailed Rules in EC 7-19 through 7-38, dealing with tribunals, with the

limited discussion elsewhere in Canon 7 about negotiation tactics.
8.

Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-4 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes

omitted).
9.

Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-5 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes

omitted).
10..

Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7.10 (emphasis added).
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is silent." Despite the dichotomy between negotiation and litigation contained
in Section 7 of the Model Code's Ethical Considerations, the accompanying
Disciplinary Rule uses stronger language than the Ethical Considerations."
Under DR 7-102 a lawyer shall not "knowingly make a false statement of law
or fact" or fail to reveal a fraud "to the affected person or tribunal, except when
the information is protected as a privileged communication." Although making
a "false statement of law or fact" is prohibited, DR 7-102 appears to be directed
at in-court conduct and seldom, if ever, has been applied to false statements that
are not "illegal."
If a lawyer has to act as a zealous advocate, then the client's interest
becomes paramount; it may overwhelm an even-handed approach to negotiations
or trials. Clients never ask for a negotiator who is "equal" to the other side-a
client wants a negotiator who is better than the other side.
The "zealous advocate" criterion received criticism during the reworking of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility into the Model Rules. Interest-

i1. EC 7-9 provides:
EC 7-9 In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his
determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a manner
consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an action in the best
interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to
forego such action.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-9 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
12. DR 7-102 provides:
DR-7-102' Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(I-) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay in trial, or take other action
on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense it if can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal,
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is
obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule.
.B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has,,in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal thefraud to the affected person or
tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall
promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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ingly, in their final formulation, the original draft of the Model Rules was altered
significantly. The final text speaks only vaguely of ethical conduct during the
course of negotiations outside the Court.
IV. THE

PROBLEM UNDER THE MODEL RULES

When the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) were drafted,
the ABA specifically rejected requiring truth in negotiations.' 3 The preamble
contained hortatory language:
As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others.
The final draft adopted this language. The Model Rules themselves,
however, contain no requirement of honest dealing. As finally adopted, the
Model Rules reflect a tension between maintaining the attorney-client privilege
and determining under what circumstances an attorney can reveal otherwise
privileged communications. Model Rule 1.6, as proposed, required an attorney
to reveal communications the lawyer reasonably believed necessary:
to prevent the client from committing a ... fraudulent act that the

lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in ... substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another. 4
As proposed, Model Rule 1.6 did not treat privileged information as a bar;
an attorney was required to speak out to prevent substantial financial injury to
another even if the client desired the information not be revealed. This rule, as
proposed, enshrined the concept of fair dealing. The proposed language was
deleted, however, because the drafters feared that the proposed Model Rule
would transform a lawyer "into a 'policeman' over a client."s The language
requiring lawyers to act if the client was going to commit a "fraudulent act"
causing substantial injury to the financial interests or property of others
disappeared completely from the final text of Model Rule 1.6. Arguably, the
disappearance implies that the Bar Association believes it proper for a lawyer to
remain silent in the face of actions that, fraudulent or not, can cause substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another as long as the information
is privileged. This implication appears to be substantiated by a corresponding
change made in the proposed Model Rule 4.1. As proposed, Model Rule 4.1
prevented a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or
law and would have required disclosure of client confidences in furtherance of

13.

Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, The Legislative History

of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates
(1987) ["Legislative History").
14. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1982).
15. See Legislative History, supra note 13.
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the Rule. In its final version, the language requiring complete truthfulness on all
6
occasions, even if it revealed a potential client confidence, was deleted.
Truthfulness and fair dealing are not required by the Model Rules. The
Official Comments take a different approach and specifically allow "puffing,"
as long as
"failing to be truthful about settlement amounts" and
7 other matters,
such statements or omissions are short of "fraud.'1
The Comment to Model Rule 1.6 interacts with the Comment to Model Rule
4.1; truth is not the objective. In negotiations, a lawyer is entitled (but never
required) to reveal client confidences if making a disclosure "facilitates a
satisfactory solution."'" A satisfactory solution is not necessarily one that is
equitable to both sides. A lawyer is not required to reveal a confidence in order
to reveal the truth. The Rule contains a clear demarcation: conduct that is
"fraudulent" is forbidden, but all else is merely part of negotiating strategy.
In light of these two rules, other language of the Model Rules, such as that
in Rule 2.1 allowing (but not mandating) lawyers to consider moral issues, may
tend to ring somewhat hollow. 9 The Comment to Model Rule 4.1 specifically
allows statements about "a party's intention as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim" to be exempted from the rule prohibiting false statements of "material

16. The revision of Model Rule 4.1, showing the deleted and added language, is as follows:
(a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(la) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(2b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.
(b) Th: dutis stated in this Rule apply even if mplian-. requirs-diolc re-o
proteotd by Rule 1.6.
.th-...is.
infn--atic
Legislative History, supra note 13, at 145.
17. The Official Comment to Model Rule 4.1 provides:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded
as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions
in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of
material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intention as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is
the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal
would constitute fraud.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 cmt. (1995).
18. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995).
19. "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1995) (emphasis added). These
rules, which relate to negotiation, are in sharp contrast to the rules regulating conduct before a
tribunal. While the language of the Model Rules 3.3(aX) and 4.1(a) is identical in stating a lawyer
"shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law.. "there was an attempt made
to subordinate the lawyer's duty of candor to the court to the rules relating to privilege. The
proposed amendments were defeated because, as the discussion notes, "the duty of candor toward the
court was regarded as paramount." Legislative History, supra note 13, at 122.
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fact;" apparently the Rule permits a lawyer to lie with impunity about settlement
authority. Model Rule 3.1, however, makes no such exemption in the comments
concerning candor to the tribunal, and probably for good reason. A lawyer who,
during a settlement conference with a judge, misstates the client's intention as
to an acceptable settlement undoubtedly acts at his or her peril. While Rule 3.4
does relate to "fairness to opposing party and counsel," it seems solely direcled
at trial procedure.
The limited rules relating to negotiation, as opposed to the broader and more
detailed rules relating to litigation, have been the subject of much commentary.
In her famous law review article, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process,
Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton noted:
The Model Rules do not exempt negotiation from ethical constraints,
but neither are the rules drafted to address the demands of bargaining
with the same specificity that they address the demands of litigation.
No rule or law requires fairness during negotiation ... * * * [In]
negotiation, where there is only the sparsest written guidance, the parties
must decide for themselves what is legal, what is factual, and what is
ethical.?0

V. AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES

Given the Model Code's emphasis on zealous representation of the client,
and the deliberate deletion of a requirement of fair dealing from the Model
Rules," one can posit a series of issues that relate to both in-court and prelitigation negotiations:

20. Eleanor H. Norton, Bargainingand the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 493, 529
(1989).
21. The following list shows the status ofthe Code and Rules nationwide as of 1994,
according
to the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct:
Alabama:
Model Rules as amended; Jan.. 1, 1991.
Alaska:
Model Rules as amended; July 15, 1993.
Arizona:
Model Rules as amended; Feb. 1, 1985.
Arkansas:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1986.
California:
Follows neither Model Rules nor Model Code; May 27, 1989.
Colorado:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1. 1993.
Connecticut:
Model Rules as amended; Oct. I, 1986.
Delaware:
Model Rules as amended; Oct. 1, 1985.
District of
Columbia:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. I, 1991.
Florida:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1,1987.
Hawaii:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. I, 1994.
Idaho:
Model Rules as amended; Nov. 1, 1986.
Illinois:
Structure of Model Rules, with substance from both Model Rules and Model Code;
Aug. 1, 1990.
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a. Failing to fully disclose the extent of settlement authority
b. Deliberate lies as a tactic in negotiations
c. Failing to give complete answers to information and instead giving
truthful but deliberately narrow answers
d. Failing to correct a misapprehension on the part of the opposing side
of a fact or law-the question of silence
e. Failing to speak or to correct a lie or misstatement or misleading
statement by your client or co-counsel
f. Defining issues or facts are "material"
g. Conflict of Law rules-which rules apply to multi-state negotiations.
Although the first five are all tactics that are designed to mislead an
opponent, some of them are entirely permissible under the Model Rules and the
Model Code in pre-litigation negotiations; however, they become impermissible
in a courtroom setting. The "permissibility" of each tactic in a negotiation
depends upon how one views conduct designed to be misleading.

Model Rules as amended; Jan. I, 1987.
Indiana:
Model Rules as amended; March 1, 1988.
Kansas:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1990.
Kentucky:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1987.
Louisiana:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1987.
Maryland:
Model Rules as amended; Oct. 1, 1988.
Michigan:
Model Rules as amended; Sept. 1, 1985.
Minnesota:
Model Rules as amended; July 1, 1987.
Mississippi:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1986.
Missouri:
Model Rules as amended; July 1, 1985.
Montana:
Model Rules as amended; March 28,1986.
Nevada:
New
Model Rules as amended; Feb. 1, 1986.
Hampshire:
Model Rules as amended; Sept. 10, 1984.
New Jersey:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1987.
New Mexico:
Amended Model Code incorporating substance ofsome Model Rules; Sept. I,1990.
New York:
North Carolina: Takes structure and substance from both Model Rules and Model Code; Oct. 7,
1985.
North Dakota: Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1988.
Model Rules as amended; July 1, 1988.
Oklahoma:
Amended Model Code incorporating substance of some Model Rules; June 1, 1986.
Oregon:
Pennsylvania: Model Rules as amended; April 1, 1988.
Rhode Island: Model Rules as amended; Nov. 15, 1988.
South Carolina: Model Rules as amended; Sept. 1, 1990.
South Dakota: Model Rules as amended; July 1, 1988.
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1. 1990.
Texas:
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1988.
Utah:
Amended Model Code incorporating substance of some Model Rules; Oct. I, 1983.
Virginia:
Model Rules as amended; Sept. 1. 1985.
Washington:
West Virginia: Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1. 1988.
Model Rules as amended; Jan. 1, 1988.
Wisconsin:
Model Rules as amended, Jan. 12, 1987.
Wyoming:
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The last two items in the list concern matters not of behavior but of law.
Defining which issues or facts are "material" requires exploring which conduct
and tactics the Model Rules and the Model Code permit. The definition chosen
may impact how a court may interpret conduct.2 2 The same conduct may be
interpreted entirely differently depending upon which law or standard may be
considered applicable-be it a state bar association's applicable Rules or Code,
or the federal or state court rules or inherent powers.
How and where one conducts negotiations, and whether the negotiations
occur before or after litigation is filed, may lead to vastly different interpretations
of permissible activities. Whether there ought to be different interpretations or
forms of behavior depending upon the forum is the focus of this paper.
VI. TACTICS DURING NEGOTIATION

Discussions of what is and is not unethical during negotiations have
consumed reams of paper with law review articles containing, in the aggregate,
thousands of footnotes. On the one side is Judge Rubin's view that there are two
precepts which should guide the lawyer's conduct in negotiations: honesty and
good faith; and that a lawyer may not accept a result that is unconscionably
unfair to the other party.23 At the other end of the spectrum are those who
argue that obtaining the best result for the client is the proper overall goal and
should be pursued vigorously in the absence of outright fraud. Discussions of
this view can be found in the writings of Professors James J. White24 and
Charles Curtis.2"
The legal community's concern with negotiating tactics is illustrated by title!,
to law review articles such as Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in
Negotiations26 and The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations."
Many of these
articles contain a search for principles that should guide attorneys during
negotiations. The fact that these authors have felt a need to develop and
articulate criteria for negotiations indicates that the Model Code and the Model
Rules are seriously deficient in this regard.

22. It is interesting to note that the word "material" appears nowhere in Rule II of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. One may speculate whether this is because a court considers every word
in every pleading to be "material." If this is so, then it undermines the Model Rules and the Model
Code's distinction between "material" issues and facts and those that are not "material" and therefore:
capable of receiving less than a fully truthful response.
23. Rubin, supra note 3, at 589, 591. Norton characterizes this as an "expression of a
universalist vision." Norton, supra note 20, at 513.
24. White, supra note 4, at 926.
25. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3(1951). Professor Norton calls
Professor Curtis' view "stark traditionalism." Norton, supra note 20, at 513.
26. Scott S.Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretchingthe Truth in Negotiations,8 Rev. Litig. 173
(1988).
27.

Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in Negotiations, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1219 (1990).
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The tension between being an effective negotiator and being truthful has
been noted succinctly and clearly by Professor Gerald B. Wetlaufer:
Effectiveness in negotiations is central to the business of lawyering and
a willingness to lie is central to one's effectiveness in negotiations.
Within a wide range of circumstances, well-told lies are highly
effective. Moreover, the temptation to lie is great not just because lies
are effective, but also because the world in which most of us live is one
that honors instrumental effectiveness above all other things. Most
lawyers are paid not for their virtues but for the results they produce.
Our clients, our partners and employees, and our families are all
counting on us to deliver the goods. Accordingly and regrettably, lying
is not the province of a few "unethical lawyers" who operate on the
margins of the profession. It is a permanent feature of advocacy and
thus of almost the entire province of law.
Our discomfort with that fact has, I believe, led us to create and
embrace a discourse on the ethics of lying that is uncritical, selfjustificatory and largely unpersuasive. Our motives in this seem
reasonably clear. Put simply, we seek the best of both worlds. On the
one hand, we would capture as much of the available surplus as we can.
In doing so, we enrich our clients and ourselves. Further, we gain for
ourselves a reputation for personal power and instrumental effectiveness.
And we earn the right to say we can never be conned. At the same
time, on the other hand, we assert our claims to a reputation for
integrity and personal virtue, to the high status of a profession, and to
the legitimacy of the system within which we live and work. Even
Gorgias, for all his power of rhetoric, could not convincingly assert both
of these claims. Nor can we . ... '
VII.

THE NOT-SO-SUBTLE ART OF MISDIRECTION

Whether the articulated standard is that lawyers "must use any legally
available move or procedure helpful to 0a client's bargaining position,"" an
"almost pathological pro-client attitude,"' or "'total annihilation' of the other
side," 3 or other, less pejorative phrases, "effective" negotiation often is said to
involve "misdirection." "Misdirection" can encompass either silence or a true
but incomplete statement of facts. Both are designed to lead the other party to
an erroneous conclusion about the facts or the client's true position. The excuse

28. Wetlaufer, supra note 27, at 1272.
29. Robert J. Condfin, Bargaining in the Dark. The NormativeIncoherence ofLawyer Dispute
Bargaining Role, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1, 71 (1992).
30. Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition ofLawyering, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 311, 330
(1990).
31. Lawry, supra note 30, at 331.
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for this behavior, according to Professor Wetlaufer, can be categorized as

follows:
[L]awyers sometimes assert that whatever they did was not a lie. These
claims are of at least five kinds: (I) "I didn't lie because I didn't
engage in the requisite act or omission"; (2) "I didn't mean to do
anything that can be described as lying"; (3) "I didn't lie because what
I said was, in some way, literally true"; (4) "I can't have lied because
I was speaking on some subject about which there is no 'truth"; and
(5) "I didn't lie, I merely put matters in their best light."'
Other methods ofjustifying a "lie" or "mistruth" exist.3 All justifications,
however, share some common themes. In all cases the negotiation process
is
claimed by attorneys not to be unfair because the parties expected (or
should

have expected) such conduct, or the result is justified because of the circumstances or because of the perceived "duty" to one's client. 4 Such justifications,
however, proceed from an initial but unspoken assumption-that being less than
truthful is acceptable conduct for a member of the legal profession.
VIII. AN

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Whether one calls it "misdirection," "puffing," "bluffing," or some other
term, one may find numerous philosophical tracts, besides biblical injunctions,35

32. Wetlaufer, supra note 27, at 1237.
33. Professor Wetlaufer includes:
1. 1lied, if you insist on calling it that, but it was an omission of kind that
is presumed
to be ethically permissible.
2. 1lied but it was legal.
3. I lied but it was on an ethically permissible subject.
4. 1lied but it had little or no effect.
5. 1lied but it was justified by the nature of the negotiations.
6. Lying is within the rules of the game.
7. 1lied but it was justified by my relationship to the victim.
Welafer, supra note 27, at 1241-50.
34.
As Professor Wetlaufer has written:
...A lie about a negotiator's authority is told with the same purpose and with
the same
effect as a lie about the true mileage of a used car. The speaker's hope
is that, by
creating some belief at variance with her own, she will get a better deal
than she could
have gotten without having created that belief. The advantages she may
hope to secure
through these lies are every bit as tangible, every bit as great, and every bit
as illegitimate
as those she might hope to secure through lies on other subjects. So is the
damage that
will be caused.
Wetlaufer, supra note 27, at 1242-43.
35. The Talmud, a 20-volume rabbinic exegesis on the Torah, the first five
books of the Bible,
contains comments and explanations of biblical language. 2 Nehama Leibowitz,
Studies in Shemot
(1976).
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contemplating whether absolute truthfulness is always desirable. The Greeks and
Romans wrote much on this subject.
Aeschylus had Promethus say:
The worst disease of all, I say,
Is fabricated speeches and disguise.36
Cicero, in his letters to his son, describes a system of moral rectitude:
But the most luxuriantly fertile field of all is that of our moral obligations-since, if we clearly understand these, we have mastered the rules
for leading a good and consistent life.

Leviticus 19:12 states "[aind deal not falsely with each other." The Talmud points out that this
implies "not only the negative avoidance of actual falsehood, but also meticulous care in refraining
from anything which might conceivably savour of untruth, even though it was not obviously
dishonest." Leibowitz, supra, at 437. Truth could be waived or altered only in the interests ofpeace.
Peace, such as not hurting another's feelings, "in certain instances is more important than telling the
whole truth." Leibowitz, supra, at 439. Note that variations from the truth were permissible only
to further peace, not to obtain a material advantage.
The Talmud also addresses whether silence was appropriate. In illustrating the biblical injunction
"[k]eep thee far from a false matter," the Talmud gives the example of a teacher who needs two
witnesses to claim some money that was stolen. Leibowitz, supra at 445. The teacher tells the
student to come along and remain silent; the other side will think that the student is the teacher's
second witness and will capitulate, and the student can remain silent the whole time. The teacher
tries to contend that this is acceptable, for the student will not have to speak and will not actually
utter an untruth. Leibowitz, supra, at 445. This conduct, however, is forbidden. The mere act of
remaining silent, leading another to an incorrect conclusion, is as unacceptable as an outright verbal
lie.
Giving misleading advice is also forbidden. It violates the rule that one should not "put a
stumbling block before the blind," Leviticus 19:14, whether the person is actually blind or merely
figuratively blind from lack of knowledge. Nehama Liebowitz, Studies in Vayikra 174, 175 (1980).
Fair dealing in pricing is given as another example. Leviticus 25:1-17 deals with the concept of
the Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee Year. Every seventh year the soil was to be untilled (the
Sabbatical Year). Every 50th year the land was to lie fallow and all landed property was to revert
to the original owners. During 49 of the years the land could be leased or sold, but during the 50th
year it returned to the original owner. Obviously, the closer one got to the Jubilee Year, the less
valuable the rights of the possessor, buyer, or lessee. Likewise, the further from the Jubilee Year,
the more the owner could get for the land. Leviticus 25:14-17 specifically requires that the price
reflect the fair value of the land in relation to the Jubilee Year. As Leibowitz notes:
[Tlhe Torah is not concerned with exclusively protecting the interests of the purchaser to
save him from exploitation, or those of the vendor, who has been forced by his straitened
circumstances to sell his ancestral field. But both parties are equally admonished to abide
by the principles ofjustice and honesty, which alone should reign in the world and which
should not be crowded out by man's selfish greed.
Leibowitz, supra, at 267.
Thus, the Talmud admonishes one to refrain from all varieties of dealings which depend upon
obtaining a false value for things, or placing a false value on things. More importantly, one should
not take advantage of the weakness of another, either by raising false hopes or by making tactless
remarks.
36. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound (Paul Roche trans., Mentor Classics 1962-64).
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The most thorough analysis of moral obligations is unquestionably that
of Panaetius, and on the whole, with certain modifications, I have
followed him. The questions relating to this topic which arouse most
discussion and inquiry are classified by Panaetius under three headings:
1. Is a thing morally right or wrong?
2. Is it advantageous or disadvantageous?
3. If apparent right and apparent advantage clash, what is to be the
basis for our choice between them?
So let us regard this as settled: what is morally wrong can never be
advantageous, even when it enables you to make some gain that you
believe to be to your advantage. The mere act of believing that some
wrongful course of action constitutes an advantage is pernicious."
Cicero wrote about situations involving hard bargaining in business and

sharp practices in the law. Among Cicero's examples was that of a merchant
from Alexandria who brought to Rhodes, which was suffering a food famine, a

large stock of corn. He was aware that other traders were on their way from
Alexandria with substantial cargoes ofgrain. The dilemma for the merchant was
whether he should tell the Rhodians this and get a lesser price, or say nothing
and get a higher price. Cicero also posits the example of an honest man who
wants to sell a house although it contains certain defects of which he alone is
aware. Should the seller reveal the defects and perhaps not sell the house at all
or for a lesser price, or should he conceal them? Cicero points out, using
Antipater and Diogenes as two poles ofthe argument, that one position is to take
a moral view and reveal everything while the other is that one should do what

is advantageous. Cicero's own view is that one should not conceal any defects:
I believe, then, that the corn-merchant ought not to have concealed the
facts from the Rhodians; and the man who was selling the house should
not have withheld its defects from the purchaser. Holding things back
does not always amount to concealment; but it does when you want

people, for your own profit, to be kept in the dark about something
which you know would be useful for them to know. Anyone can see
the sort of concealment that this amounts to-and the sort of person
who practices it. He is the reverse of open, straight forward, fair and
honest: he is a shifty, deep, artful, treacherous, malevolent, underhand,
sly, habitual rogue. Surely one does not derive advantage from earning
all those names and many more besides."

37.
38.

Cicero, Selected Works 177 (Michael Grant trans., Penguin Books 1960).
Cicero, supra note 37, at 178-79.
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Cicero traces the requirement of honesty and fair dealings to the Twelve
Tables, the earliest and most fundamental of Roman laws, circa 450 B.C., and
to the Plaetorian law, circa 192 B.C. Pointing out that honesty and fair dealing
are appropriate criteria, Cicero notes that "the laws in our Civil Code relating to
real property stipulate that in a sale any defects known to the seller have to be
declared." It was impermissible to suppress facts, even if no inquiry was made
by the other side. Cicero writes that although the civil law does not reach all
moral wrongs, there is nobility in the following formulas:
That I not be deceived and defrauded because of you and because of
trust in you. And that other golden phrase: between honest men there
must be honest dealing and no deception. 9
Cicero then discusses honest dealing, endorsing the concept. This Roman view
of the law was adopted by the French in their Civil Code. Robert Pothier, the
great French jurist, stated:
Good faith obliges the seller not only to refrain from suppressing the
intrinsic faults of what he sells, but universally from concealing
anything concerning it, which might possibly induce the buyer not to
buy it all, or not to buy at so high a price.4
Thus, the civil law system adopted, as a basic tenet, the concept of honest
dealing.
IX.

CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATION

Although both the civil law and the common law are based on principles of
Roman law," the two systems developed different approaches to the negotiation
process."2

39.
40.

Cicero, supra note 37, at 185.
Robert J. Pothier, Traite Du Contrait de Vente, in 2 Oeuvres de Pothier 106 (M. Dupin ed.,

1823).
41. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Symposium, RelationshipsAmong Roman Law,
Common Law, and Modern Civil Law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1745 (1992).
42. Because all states other than Louisiana. have a legal system based on the common law,
common-law lawyers tend to ignore the history and structure of the civil law. Litigators who have

argued a case before the esteemed and famous Judge John Minor Wisdom of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and who have attempted to wax eloquent about the majesty of the
Anglo-Saxon common law, sometimes elicit a quick response from Judge Wisdom. Judge Wisdom

has been known, during such oral argument, to paraphrase Disraeli's famous address to Parliament
and state:

Counselor, when the Angles and Saxons were howling savages, painted blue and eking
out an existence fishing on the fens of England, there was a civil law system of justice

for more than 1,000 years on the Continent of Europe from which Louisiana derived its
Civil Code.
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While the civil law has long honored truth in negotiations, the common law
took the opposite approach, postulating the rule of caveat emptor; the civil law
rule, however, is caveat venditor. In Laidlaw v. Organ, Chief Justice Marshall,
infact, rejected the concept of honesty and fair dealings when facts are "equally
accessible to both parties."43 The buyer, Organ, sought to compel delivery of
tobacco that he had purchased. Laidlaw, the seller, claimed that he was deceived
by Organ and did not have to deliver the tobacco. Laidlaw had asked, prior to
the sale, whether Organ knew of anything that might affect the tobacco's value
and Organ said nothing. In fact, Organ knew that the price of tobacco had risen
steeply because the Treaty of Ghent had been signed, ending the War of 1812.
Organ, the buyer, won because he had no obligation, said Justice Marshall, to
speak. Remaining silent was permissible," even though Organ knew that
Laidlaw was under a misapprehension. 5
This type of outcome, where sharp bargaining on behalf of one party obtains
an advantage that would not otherwise be there but for the silence or for the
misdirection, leads to "the sense of injustice."" Professor Edmond Cahn's
famous book by this title argues for a philosophy that restores a sense ofjustice
and avoids a sense of injustice in the law.
Nevertheless, philosophers have long held the opposing opinion: that
justice or righteousness is the source, the substance, and the ultimate
end of law. Such a doctrine was announced at least as early as the
Book of Leviticus and the masterpieces of the Athenian enlightenment.
It developed under the influence of the Stoics through the centuries of
decadence in the Roman republic and early empire, assumed a pseudoChristian guise by the time of Justinian's CorpusJuris,flourished amid
the brutalities of medieval Europe, and became, in the skillful hands of
Thomas Aquinas, an authentic tenet of theology. 7
X. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE AND FAIR DEALING•

Three examples will show how the Louisiana Civil Code, which traces its
roots directly back to the French Code Napoleon and the Spanish Fuero Real,"5

Bolstered by Judge Wisdom's example, it is now appropriate to review some principles of civil
law that address these issues and contrast them to the common law.
43. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817).
44. In fact, the brief of the buyer contended: "The maxim of caveat emptor could never have
crept into the law if the province of ethics had been co-extensive with it." Id. at 193.
45. For a critique of this view, see Professor Shael Herman, The Louisiana Civil Code, A
European Legacy for the United States 42-43 (Louisiana Bar Foundation 1993).
46. Edmond N. Calm, The Sense of Injustice (1964).

47.

Id. at 3.

48. For abrief introduction to the clash between those who claim the Louisiana Civil Code is
primarily either French or Spanish in origin, see Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources ofthe Louisiana
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enshrines notions of good faith, fair dealing, and not taking unconscionable
advantage of others: the concept of error, lesion beyond moiety, and redhibition.
A. The Concept of Error in the Louisiana Civil Code
More than a century before the U.C.C. enacted a rule relating to "good
faith,"' 9 before the Restatement Second, Contracts, dealt with non-disclosure 0
or half-truths," and before the Restatement, Second, Torts, dealt with materially
misleading representations, ' Louisiana law had codified rules relating to the
kinds of error that would nullify contracts. If Party A knew at the time of
contracting that Party B was laboring under an error of fact which was the
principal cause of the contract," then Party B may revoke the contract if Party
B's error proceeded from "ignorance of that which really exists, or from a
mistaken belief in the existence of that which has none."'" A failure by the
party with knowledge to correct the mistaken impression "comes under the head
of fraud."" Likewise, an error in the substance or substantial quality of an
object (e.g., the buyer purchased something believing it was silver, but it was
not) is cause to revoke the contract.5 6 "Fraud" under Louisiana law was a form
of error that voided a contract, whether the fraud was caused by a false assertion
or a suppression of the truth.57 The rules of fair dealing embodied in the

Projet of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Rodolfo Batiza, The
Influence ofSpanish Law in Louisiana, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 29 (1958); Robert A. Pascal, Sources ofthe
Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 603 (1972); Joseph M. Sweeney,
Tournament of Scholars over the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 585 (1972).
49. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) and 1-203.
50. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (1979).
51. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159 (1979).
52. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529, § 551(2) (1971).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 1826 (1870). See Marcello v. Bussiere, 284 So. 2d 892 (La. 1973).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 1821 (1870). Article 1821 is directly traceable to article 1814 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825.
55. La. Civ. Code art. 1832 (1870).
56. La. Civ. Code arts. 1843, 1844 (1870).
57. La. Civ. Code art. 1847 (1870) provided, in pertinent part:
Fraud, as applied to contracts, is the cause of an error bearing on a material part of the
contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantages
to the one party, or to cause inconvenience or loss to the other. From which definition
are drawn the following rules:
I. Error is an essential part of the definition...
2. The error must be on a material part of the contract...
3. A false assertion as to the value of that which is the object of the contract, is not such
an artifice as will invalidate the agreement, provided the object is of such a nature and is
in such a situation that he, who is induced to contract by means of the assertion, might
with ordinary attention have detected the falsehood; he shall then be supposed to have
been influenced more by his own judgment than the assertion of the other.
4. But a false assertion of the value or cost, or quality of the object, will constitute such
artifice, if the object be one that requires particular skill or habit, or any difficult or
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doctrine of error, enacted by statutory law in Louisiana in 1825, remain valid
today.58
B. Lesion Beyond Moiety
An unconscionably unfair price advantage is not, and has never been,
allowed under Louisiana law in sales of immovable property, regardless of the
skill (or lack of skill) of the negotiators. Within four years of a sale, if the seller
of land discovers that he or she has sold immovable property for less than half
its true value, either the sale can be revoked or the purchaser can be forced to
pay the true value. 9 The rule not only protects unwary sellers against sharp
buyers, but it also applies when both parties are ignorant of the immovable's true
value. This indeed is a righteous concept of fair negotiation.
C. Redhibition
Louisiana law allows, and always has allowed, a.purchaser to rescind a sale
if the thing purchased contains a defect that "renders it either absolutely useless,
or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it had he known of the vice."' Defects apparent
from a simple inspection are not covered.6 All other defects are covered,
including those in animals as well as in inanimate objects and land.62 The
seller's ignorance of the vice or defect is not an excuse that will prevent the sale
from being unwound or the price reduced. A good faith seller, however, is liable
for a narrower range of damages than a manufacturer of a defective product or
a seller who knows about, but fails to reveal, the defect. 63

inconvenient operation to discover the truth or falsity of the assertion.
5. It must be caused or continued by artifice, by which is meant either an assertion of
what is false, or a suppression of what is true...
6. The assertion and suppression, mentioned in the last preceding rule, mean not only an
affirmation or negation by words either written or spoken, but by any other means
calculated to produce a belief of what is false, or an ignorance or disbelief of what is true.
7. The artifice must be designed to obtain either an unjust advantage ...or a loss or
inconvenience to him against whom it is practiced, although attended with advantage to
no one.
58. La. Civ. Code arts. 1949, 1950, amended by 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § i.
59. La. Civ. Code arts. 1860-1880, 2589-2600 (1870). The rule of lesion does not apply to
sales of movable property. La. Civ. Code art. 2594.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2520. Article 2520 traces directly back to Article 1641 of the Code
Napoleon.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 2521.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 2526 points out that "the absolute vices of horses and mules are short
wind, glanders and founder."
63. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2531 (dealing with a good faith seller) with La. Civ. Code arts.
2545-2548 (describing the liability of one who conceals defects).

1995]

THE ETHICS OF NEGOTIATION

D. The Civil Law Enacts FairDealing
Taken together, these three concepts-error, lesion, and redhibition-show
how the civil law system promotes both truth and fair negotiations. These rules
were not evolved by courts, but rather were enacted by the legislature based
upon Roman law principles and set forth in clear and concise language which
anyone can understand.'
XI. NON-LiTIGATIoN NEGOTIATIONS

Although the vast bulk of negotiations take place outside of a litigation
context, the rules (if any) that regulate negotiations are determined primarily by
judicial decisions that, of necessity, occur after litigation. There are few reported
ABA advisory opinions on the ethics of non-litigation negotiations.6"
When the time comes for a court to rule on the limits of ethical behavior of
lawyers, the court's view often may be colored by the separate statutory and
jurisprudentially evolved standards that control an attorney's duty to the court
and to the judge. In making such rulings, however, courts seldom explicitly
discuss the differences between the professional rules that relate to negotiations
and rules that relate to in-court conduct.
Securities litigation often deals with problems analogous to ethical
negotiation, e.g., truthfullness and fair dealing, in the context of purchase and
sale of securities. There, a separate body of law defines "material facts" and
"material omissions." However, even in the highly regulated securities field,
where the liability is statutory, courts have differing views on whether fair
dealing obligations to the public outweigh obligations to clients or to a
corporation. The Dirks case is a famous example. 66 A federal court of appeals
had held that Dirks, a respected financial analyst, was properly disciplined for
failing to disclose to both the S.E.C. and the public information concerning a
company's creation of false policies and records. The fact that the financial
analyst attempted to get the Wall Street Journal to publish a story about the issue

64. The Louisiana Civil Code is remarkably easy to read and avoids grammatical contortions.
This trait is shared by all true civilian codes. Most Louisiana Civil Code articles do not exceed one
paragraph and are free from the kind of convoluted internal cross-referencing that plagues such
"codes" as the Internal Revenue Code or even the Uniform Commercial Code. For a discussion of
the evolution of the Louisiana Civil Code and its concepts, see Joseph Dainow, Introductionto The
Civil Code of Louisiana (1961); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1991); 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
65. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1518 (1986).
For a state opinion, see New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics,
Op. No. 686 (1991), on the responsibilities of a lawyer who discovers that his client may have given
materially inaccurate information to the other side.
66. Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Dirks
v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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did not cleanse the failure to disclose the information to the S.E.C or the
public. 7 Reversing the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court held that
Dirks (as a tippee of a tippee) had no duty to disclose. Because there was no
breach of duty to shareholders by insiders, "there was no derivative breach by
Dirks."'" The dissent would have found Dirks liable, claiming that an inquiry
into motives was not necessary. 9 Although the motives may have been
"laudable," Justice Blackman wrote for the dissent, "the means he chose were
not....
As a citizen, Dirks had at least an ethical obligation to report the
information to the proper authorities."70 If the courts have difficulty in
delineating ethical duties in the highly regulated securities field, then it is not
unexpected that the regulation of ethics in general negotiations is even mote
troublesome.
Some cases deal with negotiations in real estate transactions. Many involve
alleged fraud by a seller or lender and the potential liability of a lawyer handling
the closing who attempts to satisfy the conflicting demands of the lender, buyer,
and seller.7 What is interesting to note is the difficulty the courts have had in
articulating a legal standard for conduct during negotiations. Some courts simply
avoid any discussion of the topic.
For example, in Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances v.
Johnson,72 the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an attorney
discipline proceeding based upon alleged self-dealing, failure to follow the
client's instructions, and possible conflicts of interest because of multiple
representation. The attorney, Johnson, had been asked to try to find a buyer for
forty-two acres of land in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, as long as one acre was
set aside for the owner's brother. The attorney received an offer from
Richardson and others for $2,800 an acre, but the offer did not contain the set
aside for the brother; the attorney did not communicate this to the seller.
Richardson and others allegedly believed the attorney was going to act on their
behalf. A few day's later, the attorney's law clerk and several others put
together a group and made an offer for $3,000 an acre, which the attorney did
transmit to the seller, but the attorney did not tell the Richardson group about the

67. Dirks also acted knowingly when he passed on his information to clients before going
to the SEC. in violation of his duty to the public and the SEC and in violation of his
informants' disclose-or-refrain obligations. Therefore, it is not precisely relevant whether
Dirks subjectively "knew" that his clients would trade. He knowingly took improper
actions and put parties who were reasonably likely to trade without disclosure in a
position to do so.
The record thus amply supports the SEC's finding that Dirks acted with requisite
scienter for aiding or abetting liability under Rule lob-S.
Dirks, 681 F.2d at 846.
68. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667, 103 S. Ct. at 3268.
69. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 673, 103 S. Ct. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 677, 103 S. Ct. at 3273 (emphasis added).
71. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v, Klein, 538 So. 2d 559 (La. 1989).
72. 447 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1971).
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$3,000 an acre offer. The seller cashed the law clerk group's earnest money
check. Only then did the attorney tell the Richardson group that the seller had
"rejected" their offer. Although the Richardson group subsequently told the
attorney to give the seller "whatever she wanted," the attorney neither transmitted
this proposal nor told the Richardson group that the property had already been
sold. The attorney then entered into a side agreement with the law clerk to
purchase a half interest in the property.
The district court suspended the attorney, but the appellate court reversed
finding the attorney had been denied due process in not being told expressly
about the charges against him. In the course of its discussion, the Third Circuit
noted that the crucial issues involved potential conflicts ofinterest (Canon 7) and
potentially misleading a party not represented by counsel (Canon 9); however,
absent from the appellate court's discussion (perhaps because of the procedural
posture of the case) is any attempt to outline the proper rules that relate to
negotiations.
Stare v. Tate stands out as one of the few reported cases involving prelitigation negotiations that do not involve securities or a sale of immovable
property." The dispute arose out of a property settlement in a divorce case.
The wife's attorney, through a series of negotiations, offered a property
settlement with a serious mistake in the valuation of the property; the mistake
was to the wife's detriment. The husband's attorney was aware of the mistake
and counter offered using the same mistaken valuation number. The counter
offer was accepted by the wife's attorney and the instrument reflecting the
counter offer was later approved by a court as a property settlement. After the
divorce became final, the former husband sent the former wife a copy of the
mistaken valuation with a notation: "Please note $100,000.00 mistake in your
figures." After receiving the note, the former wife filed suit to revoke the
property settlement. The court allowed the property settlement to be revoked
based on unilateral mistake. Underlying the court's holding, although not
explicit; is the implication that the former husband's attorney, who had
knowledge of the mistake when making the counter offer, had the duty to inform
his opposing counsel of the mistake in valuation.
Arguably the husband's lawyer's behavior did not fall within the prohibition
of Model Rule 4.1, which only prohibits making a "false statement of material
facts." While the Comment to Model Rule 4.1 states that a misrepresentation
can occur "if a lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another that the
lawyer knows is false," the valuation, arguably, was not false, simply mistakenly
low. Would a bar association discipline the husband's lawyer in this instance?
Would there be endless arguments whether the valuation was "false" and whether
the husband's lawyer made a "statement" or merely remained silent. Was the
statement "material"? Is this the type of problem that Justice Marshall would

73.

98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. 2d 1971).
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have no problem disposing of as he did in Laidlaw, by holding that the
negotiation was fair because the information was equally available to both sides?
Cases where ethics of non-litigation negotiations were the subject ofstate bar
association disciplinary proceedings are few and far between. Commission on
Legal Ethics v. Printi' is an interesting proceeding. In Printz, the West
Virginia Supreme Court dismissed charges against an attorney for whom the bar
had recommended public discipline. The attorney handled negotiations between
his father and the father's employee, who embezzled over $300,000.00 from the
company. Originally, the employee agreed to cooperate, to work for the
company until it was sold, and to help find the missing funds. The embezzler's
father was then called to a meeting whose purpose "unquestionably was to
determine if [the father] would cover the losses caused by the son."" Afterwards, the lawyer sent the embezzler a "final demand" letter giving him a choice
between a "strict financial arrangement" for repayment of the embezzled money
or criminal prosecution.76 Only after the negotiations broke down was the son
turned over to the authorities and later convicted. The court found no problem
with the attorney's actions, holding they did not violate West Virginia law."
Likewise, the court found no violation of West Virginia's Model Code,
Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A). 78 The court noted this rule was not incorporated
into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A)
prohibited a lawyer from threatening to present criminal charges only to obtain
an advantage in civil matters. This Disciplinary Rule was in effect at the time,
but was found by the court to be "unworkable." The court relied on Professors
Hazard and Hodes' book, The Law of Lawyering, A Handbook On The Model
Rules Of Professional Conduct, for the proposition that one of the reasons that
Disciplinary Rule 7-105(A) was omitted from the Model Rules was that the
standards "were overbroad,
because they prohibit legitimatepressure tactics and
79

negotiation strategies.
A number of lawyers have exhibited great concern that over-regulation of
negotiations would be bad for the profession because it would limit a lawyer's

74. 416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1992).
75. Printz, 416 S.E.2d at 722.
76. Id.
77. Although a West Virginia statute prohibited a victim of a crime from seeking restitution
in lieu of criminal prosecution, the court found this statute "void under the Doctrine of Desuetude."
Id. at 727. The Doctrine of Desuetude is based upon the concept of an old law so out of use that
it would be unfair to apply it today. It is interesting to note that in ruling on Desuetude, the court
quoted from Pryor v. Gainer, 351 S.E.2d 404, 411 (1986), which itself cited the applicable principle

"found in Book 10 of the Digest of Justinian." Of course, the Justinian Digest was one of the
foundations of the civil law.
78. The rule did not differ in any material respect from the ABA Model Code.
79. Printz,416 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard & William W. Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering, A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 4.4:103 (1990) (emphasis

added).
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ability to get the best deal possible for a client. Arguments that have been raised
include:
1. Negotiations need not be "even" at all. The object is to get the best
deal for your client. If the other side is not skilled as a negotiator, your
client should not be made to suffer but rather should reap the benefits.
2. Why should there be a different standard imposed when the lawyer
is doing the negotiation rather than the client? The client can take
whatever "unfair" advantage (within the bound of laws relating to
securities and general law relating to fraud) the client wants. A lawyer
is somewhat more restricted, but to impose additional ethical duties on
a lawyer would mean that lawyers would be less involved in transactions, to the detriment of all parties, because at least the few rules that
relate to lawyers assure some semblance of ethical conduct during the
course of the negotiations.
3. To require a party to state all material facts, to require a party to
determine if the other side knows all material facts or law, or to require
a party to correct all misunderstandings of material issues, would lead
to endless litigation that would be ultimately counter-productive to the
negotiation process. It is hard enough to define "material" when a
statement or omission has been made in the securities context; to
require this to be done for both fact and law during fluid negotiations,
most of which are oral, would slow down commerce and prevent
transactions from ever being consummated. It would lead to "over
lawyering" and far too much expense. Many argue that ascertaining
what is "material" in the absence of illegal fraud is unworkable.
Arguments about "materiality" lead to abstract discussions of knowledge
and whether anything is knowable, particularly insofar as it concerns the
truth or falsity of ideas, and philosophers have pondered the issue of
80
"knowledge" for hundreds of years.

80.

See Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Liebniz, Knowledge and Metaphysics 283 (Wiener

trans., 1951):
Since questions concerning the truth and falsity of ideas are being discussed and argued
today by eminent men, and since Descartes himself did not ever give a thoroughly

satisfactory solution to this problem, a subject of the greatest significance for the
knowledge of truth. I propose here to explain briefly my understanding of the necessary
distinctions and criteria of ideas and knowledge. Knowledge is either obscure or clear;
clear ideas again are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or
inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge, finally, is that which is both
adequate and intuitive.

Discussion of metaphysics and knowledge is not confined to philosophers-the Model Rules
themselves, in the Comments to Rule 1.6, discuss when an attorney may breach the attomey-client
privilege in a philosophical vein:
The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily injury
which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a
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4. The current rules are sufficient to protect all parties.
These types of responses, well-argued and logically put forth, nonetheless
appear to bypass the basic issue-is a lawyer's duty primarily to the client or to
the profession? If it is to the former, then these points all have force. On the
other hand, if the profession is ultimately to be grounded in ethics and morality,
then these responses are inadequate. Rather, we should strive to create rules that
mandate moral and ethical results, not merely adequate ones or defensible ones.
XII. Do LITIGATION RULES APPLY TO NON-LITIGATION NEGOTIATIONS?
Negotitation is an alternative to litigation. Because the process is voluntary,
either party can refuse to negotiate."' Therefore, each party agrees with the
result. If both parties agree, then it may seem irrelevant to try to determine who
is the "winner" and who is the "loser." Yet, it is often the case that one side is
perceived as the "winner" because it obtained the better side of the deal.
Because winners seldom complain about the loser's negotiations, it might be
argued that unethical conduct on behalf of losers in negotiations should be of
little concern because it is never litigated. Put another way, the risk of a
"winner" being sued for some alleged unethical negotiation conduct may be
significant, while the risk of the "loser" being sued for its conduct may be
nominal. "Winners" may console themselves in believing that the risk of future
litigation about their negotiation conduct may not be great in the absence of
outright fraud, or outside of the securities law context; such a belief may be
illusory. Not surprisingly, the cases on negotiation conduct seem to arise either
from complaints by the losing side in negotiation, or through court-initiated
procedures because a judge feels that the respect for or integrity of the judicial
process may have been violated.82
As noted, the Model Rules do contain specific provisions on duties to
tribunals. In addition, the federal courts have an extensive body of law dealing
with a lawyer's duty to the court. This includes Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. §1927 and
the court's "inherent powers."
Rule I Is3 requires that a lawyer's signing of a pleading constitutes a
representation, made "after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," that
lawyer to "'know"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client
may have a change of mind.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. (1995) (emphasis added).
81. Even binding arbitration is voluntary in the sense that the parties, at some point, must have
voluntarily consented to the process of binding arbitration. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
explore whether contracts containing binding arbitraion clauses can be contracts of adhesion.
82. For example, see Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 281 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A judge has
an abiding obligation to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a lawyer for
professional conduct of which the judge becomes aware.").
83. Rule 11 was amended by the U.S. Supreme Court by its order of April 22, 1993, effective
December 1,1993. The language quoted appears in both the former and current text of Rule II.
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the pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose, that claims and
defenses are warranted, and that allegations or denials of fact are believed to
have evidentiary support." Although, on its face, the rule governs only written
pleadings, courts have applied it to parties signing a non-pleading document
submitted to the court. 8
Section 1927 of the United States Code" allows courts to impose sanctions
for bad faith conduct in litigation. It specifically allows costs, expenses, and
attorneys fees to be assessed against the sanctioned lawyer "or other person."'"
Finally, federal courts have recognized that actions, which may not violate
either Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927, still can be sanctioned under the court's
"inherent power." The leading case is Chambers v. NASCO, Inc." In
Chambers, a district court imposed almost a million dollars in attorneys' fees
against a party whose conduct was found to be improper, although the judge had
found no violation of either Rule 11 or of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The majority, in
a 5-4 decision, rejected any notion that Rule 11 or the statute placed a limitation
on the court's inherent authority, under Article III of the Constitution, to impose
penalties on either counsel or client.'9 The four dissenters objected both to the
fee-shifting allowed by the majority" and to the "vast expansion of the power
of federal courts, unauthorized by rule or statute. "' In particular, Justice
Kennedy warned that the use of inherent powers to punish parties and attorneys
was dangerous when applied to matters that occurred prior to suit being filed.9"

84. Failure to comply with Rule I I can lead to sanctions.
85. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 498 U.S. 533, 111 S. Ct. 922
(1991).
86. "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any territory thereof who so multiples the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
87. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1988).
88. 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
89. Justice White, writing for the majority, stated:
We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of the statute and the rules
displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above.
These other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are not substitutes for the inherent power,
for that power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S. Ct. at 2134. "The Court's prior cases have indicated that the
inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same
conduct." Id. at 49, 111 S. Ct. at 2135. "Here the District Court did not attempt to sanction
petitioner for breach of contract, but rather imposed sanctions for the fraud he perpetrated on the
court and the bad faith he displayed toward both his adversary and the court throughout the course
of the litigation." Id. at 54, 111 S. Ct. at 2138.
90. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58, 111 S. Ct. at 2140 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 60, 111 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
92. "Because I believe the proper exercise of inherent powers requires exhaustion of express
sanctioning provisions and much greater caution in their application to redress prelitigation conduct,
I dissent." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61, 111 S. Ct. at 2141. See also Justice Kennedy's extensive
discussion at 501 U.S. at 72-76, 111 S. Ct. at 2147-49.
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Chambers seems to indicate that federal courts can use their "inherent
powers" to punish conduct that occurs in court, outside of court, or even before
suit is filed. Chambersholds that this punishment can extend to compelling one
side to pay the other's "entire ...litigation costs."" Therefore, under a broad
reading of Chambers, negotiating tactics and conduct which are not even
mentioned in the Model Code or Model Rules, and which may not be subject to
bar disciplinary proceedings, can become sanctionable later in a federal court.
Even a narrow reading of Chambers, however, demonstrates that federal courts
have broad power to impose stringent penalties on lawyers and litigants, even if
this behavior does not violate Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.9
A lawyer who might, with impunity, remain silent during negotiations if
another side is under a misapprehension of law or fact, or who might with
impunity fail to set forth all of the material facts during the course of negotiations, acts at his or her peril in the litigation context. The failure to disclose all
pertinent authority, both pro and con, is directly sanctionable. The new federal
discovery rules take exactly this approach-voluntary disclosure of material facts
and issues and witnesses is required, even if the opposing party would not
otherwise have asked the correct questions during discovery. Lawyers may have
a hard time explaining to a federal court why conduct which seems appropriate
and, arguably, is not subject to state bar disciplinary rules when no litigation is
involved should be treated differently when the court views a situation. Given
the differences between the standards of conduct for in-court and out-of-court
negotiation, one might reach two differing conclusions: (1) the two standards of
conduct are justified; or (2) there should be only one standard of conduct-the
higher one imposed by the courts. Courts may well impose, consciously or
unconsciously, the higher standard of conduct in court-analyzed negotiations
whether those negotiations occurred prior to or during litigation.
Three cases illustrate how courts deal with litigation-related negotiations:
May v. Winn Dixie," Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold Storage
Co., 96 and Kath v. Western Media, 'Inc.97
In May,98 the plaintiff's attorney filed a petition seeking damages in tort;
in accordance with state law, no prayer for a dollar amount of damages was
contained in the pleadings. The defendant requested a jury trial. Negotiations
ensued and the plaintiffs counsel made an offer to settle for $75,000; the
defendant countered with $7,500, which was rejected. On the eve of trial, Ihe

93.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 40, 111 S. Ct. at 2130.

94. Note that throughout this portion of the discussion, the references are to federal court
sanctions, not to discipline by state bars. One would think that unethical conduct would be subject
to state bar discipline; however, there are few reported disciplinary cases by state bars dealing with
ethics in negotiations.
95. 613 So. 2d 1026 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 704 (1993).
96. 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
97. 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
98. 613 So. 2d 1026.
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plaintiff's attorney moved to strike the demand for a jury trial, claiming that the
case did not involve in excess of $20,000 (the amount needed for a jury trial
under state law), and attached the plaintiff's affidavit in support of this
proposition. Although the defendant strenuously objected, claiming that the
plaintiff ought to be bound by at least the amount her counsel demanded in postfiling negotiations, neither the trial court nor the appellate court found anything
wrong with the plaintiff's counsel's tactics.
Although May ostensibly involved only a procedural issue, the proper time
to fix the damages amount for a jury claim, the appellate opinion is curiously
lacking any ethical discussion. Indeed, one might infer from the opinion that the
court condoned the plaintiffs attorney's tactics-demanding more money in
settlement than was actually owed in damages and then taking a position in court
filings that showed the demand itself had no basis in fact. Given the low esteem
in which members of the legal profession are said to be held, the apparent
condoning of these tactics by a state appellate court may have an adverse impact
on the public's perception of the kind of ethical behavior courts can or should
tolerate in members of the Bar.
In Virzi," the plaintiff's attorney filed a personal injury action against the
defendant which was deferred to a mediation panel prior to the final pre-trial
conference. After the plaintiff's attorney filed the request for non-binding
mediation, the plaintiff died. Although at the time of the mediation the
plaintiff's attorney was unaware of his client's death, when he later learned of
this fact he did not reveal it during a pretrial conference. After negotiations
occurred at the pretrial conference, the parties settled for the amount of the
mediation award. Only as they were leaving the judge's chambers did the
plaintiff's attorney tell the defendant's attorney about the death of the plaintiff.
The court's opinion stated that the plaintiff's attorney had an ethical duty to
promptly advise both the court and the defendant's attorney of the death of the
plaintiff; the court deemed this an "absolute ethical obligation." The court noted
a possible distinction between the duty to disclose information to a court and the
duty to make a disclosure to opposing counsel. Without discussing specifically
whether the same rule applied in a non-litigation context, the court resolved the
issue in favor of a high ethical standard. The court stated:
There is no question that plaintiff's attorney owed a duty of candor to
this Court, and such duty required a disclosure of the fact of the death
of a client. Although it presents a more difficult judgment call, this
Court is of the opinion that the same duty of candor and fairness
required a disclosure to opposing counsel even though counsel did not
ask whether the client was still alive. Although each lawyer has a duty
to contend, with zeal, for the rights of his client, he also owes an
affirmative duty of candor and frankness to the Court and to opposing

99.

571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
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counsel when such a major event such as the death of the plaintiff has
taken place.
This Court feels that candor and honesty necessarily require
disclosure of such a significant fact as the death of one's client.
Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he would
deal in the marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater honesty,
greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might not be in
the interest of the client or his estate.'
In Kath,'0 ' a question arose about which parties an attorney represented;
the issue was whether the attorney previously had represented all five shareholders in related litigation, or whether the attorney had represented only two of the
five. The deposition of the attorney was taken and he testified that he
represented all five and did not know that two of the five were going to file suit
against the other three. Based upon the deposition, the defendants offered to
settle the case for the $12,000.00, and the plaintiffs orally accepted the
defendants' offer. Only after the settlement agreement was reached orally did
the defendants discover that the plaintiffs' attorney had written a letter to the
attorney who had been deposed. In that letter, the plaintiff's attorney revealed
that he was aware of written evidence by the attorney who had been dropped that
contradicted the deposition testimony. After the defendants found out both about
the written evidence and that the plaintiffs' counsel had known about it, the
defendants revoked the offer to settle and the plaintiffs moved to compel the
settlement. The court held that the plaintiffs' attorney had an ethical duty to
disclose the written evidence to opposing counsel and to the court. The court
apparently based the decision more upon a duty of candor to the court than a
duty to opposing counsel, specifically because the matter related to a deposition
an4 to discussions during litigation.
Judges do not take lightly a misstatement of fact made to them. In
02
Southerland v. County of Oakland,"
a plaintiff's attorney with a 50% contingency fee arrangement agreed to a $500,000.00 settlement and sought court
approval. The trial court had some concern about the 50% contingency fee but
approved the settlement when the plaintiffs attorney assured the court that he
would absorb the cost of litigation and pay a Medicaid lien that had affected the
plaintiff s property. When the plaintiffs attorney subsequently failed to pay the
lien the court set aside its prior judgment and reduced the attorney's fees to 1/3.
The court stated:

100. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512 (emphasis added). See also Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116
N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962); Newman v. Fjelstad, 137 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1965); Simons v. Schiek's,
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1966); Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Fell, 364 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio 1977). See
also Virginia State Bar Op. 952 (1987) (indicating a lawyer need not tell the other side of the death
of a client unless asked about it).
101. 684 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1984).
102. 77 F.R.D. 727 (E.D. Mich. 1978), ajfd, 628 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Where a fraud upon the Court has been demonstrated, dominating
reasons of justice permit the assessment of the costs of the entire
proceedings, including attorney's fees against the guilty party."°3
Apparently the rationale for assessing this penalty was the inherent power of the
court. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, with the appellate court finding
that the attorney "had committed fraud on the court."" 4
XIII. CONFLICTS OF LAW

There is no single, nationally-recognized non-litigation ethical rule that
applies to all lawyers. Given the lack of a single, uniform set of bar rules on
ethical obligations, which law a court later applies may have a huge impact on
a lawyer's potential liability for alleged unethical conduct. If a lawyer is
licensed in State A, negotiates a deal with a lawyer in State B, involving a
corporation located in State C and incorporated in State D, involving a
transaction that occurs in State E, then there are potentially conflicting ethical
rules in four different states that might apply. An analysis of this area is beyond
the scope of this paper. Attorneys engaged in multi-state transactions, however,
must proceed cautiously. A court in one state may find a higher standard of
conduct applicable than the standard adopted by the bar of the state in which the
attorney is licensed.'0 5
XIV. CONCLUSION

The inherent tension between the duty to represent a client and the duty to
the profession mirrors a practical tension between wanting to get the best deal
possible for your side and the duty of ethical fair dealing. There is a discernable
difference between the Model Rules and Model Code's treatment of conduct
practiced outside of litigation in negotiation and the judicial rulings concerning
the same conduct during litigation, especially conduct occurring in the presence
of the court. The fact that the bar has failed to adopt the same rules for nonlitigation and litigation negotiations does not make the apparent distinction drawn
by the bar one of which we should be proud.
Reported decisions indicate that bar associations have not sought to police
the ethics of negotiations. It can be anticipated that developements in ethical

103. Southerland, 77 F.R.D. at 734.
104. Southerland, 628 F.2d at 979.
105. For example, in NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television &Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120 (W.D.
La. 1989), aff'd and remanded, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aMassachusetts lawyer was sanctioned
by a federal judge in Louisiana under the court's "inherent powers." In considering possible
reciprocal discipline, the Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed the complaint after a complete
review of the record, finding "no support" for the charges or the sanctions. In re McCabe, 583
N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1991).
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standards for negotiations will occur primarily in litigation, when offended parties
seek redress concerning alleged unfair or unjust negotiation tactics. Therefore,
it will not be surprising if a uniform set of jurisprudential rules governing the
ethics of negotiation are adopted by the courts. Likewise, it should not be
unexpected if these court-developed uniform rules reflect the higher standards
imposed upon litigation-related conduct, whether or not the negotiations occurred
before or after a suit was filed.
The ethical basis of negotiations should be one of truth and fair dealing; that,
as professionals, lawyers should "not accept a result that is unconscionably unfair
to the other party."' " Some may disagree; however, it would be hard to argue
with a more practical formulation, given the serious possibility that a single
standard will ultimately evolve jurisprudentially:
Ifyou would not do something in acourtroom context, if
you would not
make a misleading statement in a settlement conference with ajudge,
and if
you would not remain silent about a misstatement made by your
client or partner during discussions in court chambers or in open court,
then you should not do any ofthese things in non-litigation negotiations,
whether or not they take place prior to or after the filing of a lawsuit.
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Rubin, supra note 3, at 591.

